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Despite the elaborated techniques of electronic surveillance, personal sources of information still re­
main the best possible method of infiltrating a criminal milieu. Such methods gain special impor­
tance in totalitarian states. Collaborating with the Security Service almost always had some notable 
benefits. For some of the TWs, collaborating was an additional, sometimes quite substantial, source 
of income. One of repeating motives for collaboration was a will to improve one’s professional po­
sition or to easily obtain a permission to go abroad. There were also persons, who were impressed 
with having contacts with the Security Service functionaries. Almost all collaborators were using 
different forms of help from the part of the Security Service. Most of them would obtain real finan­
cial and material profits. The spectrum of favours offered to those helping the repressive state appa­
ratus was very extensive.
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Preliminary remarks
Despite the elaborated techniques of electronic surveillance, person-
al sources of information still remain the best possible method of infiltrat-
ing a criminal milieu. such methods gain special importance in totalitari-
an states where the governments endeavour to control the whole society, 
which implies that there is a need to build networks of informants in all 
milieu. This was the case in Poland and in other countries, which fell un-
der communist regime after World War ii. looking from the modern-day 
perspective one might get the impression that creating a system of omni-
present surveillance was one of the main goals of the Polish Communist 
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Party (PZPr) and of the ministry of the internal affairs which handled its 
implementation.
The most valuable type of a personal source of information (oZi) was 
a secret collaborator (TW), and his connections with political police had 
a formalised character. in most cases a TW would sign a collaboration ob-
ligation. Often he would be remunerated financially or given in-kind bene-
fits. Secret collaborators would personally choose pseudonyms, but in rare 
cases pseudonyms would be given by the security service (sb) function-
aries. Until 1960 there were three categories of tW – agent, informant and 
resident. The agent was the most valuable category of a collaborator, as it 
was the agent’s task to actively infiltrate his milieu. the informant was ba-
sically responsible for watching persons from his circles, whereas the res-
ident’s aim was to create his own network of informants. Since 1960 these 
three categories were substituted by one – secret collaborator (tW). this 
category functioned until the end of the Polish People’s republic (Prl). in 
the same time, a new category of personal source of information was cre-
ated – civil support.1
Categories of the security service’s (sb) collaborators who were active 
in the 1970s and 1980s were defined in the instructions Regarding Opera-
tions of the security service subordinate to ministry of internal affairs, 
which was an appendix to Resolution no. 006/70 issued by the Minister 
of internal Affairs on February 1, 1970, Regarding Operations of the Secu-
rity service subordinate to the ministry of internal affairs.2 The resolution 
was signed by the internal Affairs Minister of the day, Kazimierz Świtała. 
according to the instructions, the category of a secret Collaborator, for-
mally introduced in 1960, was sustained, whereas two new categories of 
collaborators were created in the same time –  service contact (KS) and op-
erational contact (ko). The latter two substituted the category of civil sup-
port (sometimes called also civil contact or discrete contact). There was also 
1 ruzikowski Tadeusz, Agenci [Agents], Biuletyn instytutu Pamięci narodowej, 
no. 3/2005, p. 36-48.
2 Instrukcja o pracy operacyjnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa resortu spraw wewnętrznych. Za­
łącznik do Zarządzenia nr 006/70 ministra spraw wewnętrznych z dnia 1 lutego 1970 r. w sprawie 
pracy operacyjnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa resortu spraw wewnętrznych [instruction on the ope-
rations of the security service of the ministry of internal affairs. attachment to ordinance 
no. 006/70 of the Ministry of internal Affairs of February 1, 1970 on the operations of the 
security service of the ministry of internal affairs] [in:] ruzikowski Tadeusz [ed.], In­
strukcje pracy operacyjnej aparatu bezpieczeństwa (1945­1989) [instruction on the operations of 
Security Service (1945-1989)], Warszawa 2004, p. 121-139.
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a new category prepared for persons to be called consultants.3 The number 
of secret collaborators varied significantly throughout the period of func-
tioning of Polish People’s Republic. in 1988 the number of secret collabora-
tors in the network reached almost 100,000 (98,000). the size of the agents’ 
net had never been as large before – not even during the period of Stalin’s 
rule, when at its peak in 1953 the number of operations department’s col-
laborators reached 85,000. On the other hand side, the statistics show that 
the lowest number of active collaborators functioned in 1960 – only 8,720 
persons in the whole country. surveillance of a wide spectrum of polish 
society was the responsibility of the Department iii of the security service. 
The size of the agents networks in different milieu depended directly on 
the level of danger the milieu posed. in 1976 Department iii maintained 
the highest number of secret collaborators in industrial production facili-
ties (over 3.4 thousand secret collaborators, which constituted about 40% 
of all secret collaborators of the Department iii). academic institutions, 
and especially higher education institutions, were the second largest area 
of surveillance (over 1 thousand secret collaborators, 12%), and agricul-
ture was monitored by almost 700 tWs (8%).4
The circumstances and the recruitment method used to acquire a new 
informant were of crucial importance to further cooperation. This is the 
reason why Security Service officers had to pay the most careful atten-
tion to the “acquirement” talk. usually they would collect any possible in-
formation regarding a potential candidate with all due diligence before 
such a talk would be organised. The candidate’s position in his milieu 
was carefully analysed, especially his potential for performing operations 
at the time being and in a longer perspective. The instructions regarding 
operations of the security service… allowed the recruitment to be execut-
ed on the following basis:
[...] compromising materials, if one can suspect that the fear of their publication might 
incline the candidate to agree to collaborate, on special occasions, proofs of criminal 
activity, pursuit of obtaining personal benefits. in some special cases, justified by op-
erational activity, it was allowed to deliberately create circumstances favourable to re-
cruitment. The instructions also pointed to a possibility of recruiting persons “who 
3 Wokół teczek bezpieki – zagadnienia metodologiczno­źródłowe [around special servi-
ce files – methodological and resource issues], Musiał Filip [ed.], Kraków 2006, p. 46-50; 
Osobowe źródła informacji – zagadnienia metodologiczno­źródłoznawcze [Personal sources of in-
formation – methodological and resource issues], Musiał Filip [ed.], Kra ków 2008.
4 ruzikowski Tadeusz, Agenci... [Agents...], p. 43, 47.
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would agree to become a collaborator because of internal sense of shared civic respon-
sibility for safety and public order.5
in September 1983 the Director of SB Department iii-1 in Krakow, ma-
jor MA Wiesław hryniewicz, underlining the need to develop the net-
work of oZi at Jagiellonian university (uJ), described the methods of ac-
quiring new collaborators in the following way:
The actions aiming at the development of the network of TW in the spaces and milieu 
under surveillance of the Department iii-1 shall be executed through:
– pointing the current sources at acquiring information about persons from their 
surroundings who might have the prerequisites that would justify an attempt of 
acquiring them
– conducting talks with persons going abroad and maintaining contacts with for-
eigners
– using compromising materials obtained from police units
– analysing thoroughly the information sent from the “W” Department and Bu-
reau6
– using information obtained from KOs and KSs regarding conflicts and inaccura-
cies in their work and research areas
– analysing and using preliminary materials gathered in the so called desk files.7
among the TWs recruited by Department iii of Provincial bureau 
of internal Affairs (WUSW) in Krakow in 1980s, the largest group was 
formed by persons who decided to collaborate on the basis of “shared civ-
ic responsibility”. the concept defined: 
[...] a pursuit to actively stand against the existing inaccuracies; ideological and politi-
cal convictions and psychological and emotional factors.8 
The analysis of individual cases shows that this was a very vast concept 
and did not necessarily had much in common with loyalty to Prl. often it 
explained opportunism, procrastination, but also human fear of the securi-
ty forces and subconscious fear about the sake of one’s family. sometimes 
agents would be recruited on the basis of compromising materials, howev-
er much more frequently they would agree to cooperate with the security 
5 Instrukcja o pracy operacyjnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa… [instruction on the operations of 
the Security Service...], p. 127-128.
6 Correspondence control.
7 Archive of the institute of national Remembrance in Kraków (AiPn Kr) 056/96, 
p. 85-86. 
8 Franaszek Piotr, “Jagiellończyk”. Działania Służby Bezpieczeństwa wobec Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego w latach osiemdziesiątych XX w. [“Jagiellonczyk”. security service operations 
towards the Jagiellonian University in the 1980s.], Kraków 2012, p. 62-68.
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service out of the fear of disciplinary or legal responsibility. sometimes 
such anxieties were justified, however usually they were the result of pure 
human fear.9 in most cases it was the fear of the consequences of causing 
an accident or driving under the influence of alcohol. there were some ex-
ceptions of more serious offences like taking part in a fight or stealing.10
Privileges
Collaborating with the security service almost always had some nota-
ble benefits and – in many aspects – brought privileged position in one’s 
milieu. For some of the TWs, collaborating was an additional, sometimes 
quite substantial, source of income. one of repeating motives for collabo-
ration was a will to improve one’s professional position or to easily obtain 
a permission to go abroad. There were also persons, who were impressed 
with having contacts with the security service functionaries. They felt sat-
isfaction and – in their own view – superiority to the persons from their mi-
lieu. almost all collaborators were using different forms of help from the 
part of the Security Service. Most of them would obtain real financial and 
material profits. Whereas a relatively small group of OZi was not remuner-
ated in any tangible way. The spectrum of favours offered to those helping 
the repressive state apparatus was very extensive. Possible benefits and ad-
vantages in obtaining a privileged position that were accessible to persons 
collaborating with the security service are presented below, with regard to 
the network of agents functioning at the Jagiellonian university.11
Financial remuneration
according to regulations imposed by the instructions regarding 
operations…, a secret collaborator should be reimbursed for all the ex-
9 AiPn Kr 056/108, vol. 2, p. 82.
10 Franaszek Piotr, “Jagiellończyk”... [“Jagiellonczyk”...], p. 62-68.
11 Franaszek Piotr, Agentura Służby Bezpieczeństwa na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim w latach 
osiemdziesiątych [Security Service intelligence at the Jagiellonian University in the 1980s] [in:] 
Franaszek Piotr [ed.], Naukowcy władzy, władza naukowcom [scientists for authority, authority 
for scientists], Warszawa 2010, p. 120-140.
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penses incurred when executing a given mission. When a security service 
officer met with the collaborator in a restaurant or a café he would take 
the bill. The agent was also to be reimbursed for all books and other ma-
terials printed without the consent of censorship that he had purchased 
and brought to the security service. but the additional remuneration ob-
tained was an important aspect of the activity of the agents’ network. The 
instructions regarding operations of the security service… underlined 
the need to reward the TWs: 
[...] appropriately reward the achievements, diligence and initiative (a pecuniary or in-
kind reward, assistance in difficult situations), keeping in mind that the prize should 
never become a factor inclining to unrealistic or subjective informing.12
the basic form of compensation was financial, paid in cash. it was an 
effective method of binding an oZi to the security service. according to 
some preserved accounts, the money would be paid to secret collaborators 
as long as until the end of 1989 and even in 1990.
The analysis of the materials in the archives points to a close correla-
tion between the sums of money collected and the level of activity and use-
fulness of a secret collaborator. a TW could be offered disproportionally 
large amounts of money given his level of commitment only in the begin-
ning, immediately after he had been recruited.  There are even document-
ed cases of paying the agent already during the first meeting. it was a form 
of a bait. in practice an agent would be accounted and remunerated for 
having performed a certain task. Taking active part in operations executed 
by the security service was the best-paid option, and such actions included 
taking over polygraphic materials and apparatus or already printed leaf-
lets, or running destructive activities in clandestine oppositional organi-
sations and groups. Providing information that was already widespread 
resulted in significantly lower remuneration. Such common-knowledge 
information did not have much value to the sb operations. repeatedly, 
the leading officer would refuse to pay anything, in this way “punishing” 
his agent for not fulfilling the task he was assigned properly.
the collaborator would prepare the bill confirming the receipt of the 
money in handwriting and he would sign it with his pseudonym. This is 
the reason why in the work files of the tWs there are so many sheets and 
scraps of paper that were torn down from notebooks and notepads, often 
12 Instrukcja o pracy operacyjnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa … [instruction on the operational 
work of the Security Service...], p. 130.
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crumpled and with irregular fringes – they all served as money receipts. 
the officer would present them at the cash-desk of the Security Service. 
money spent on such purposes would be listed in the balance sheets of 
the Operational Fund of SB Department iii. According to §1 from the 
Resolution of the Minister of internal Affairs issued on December 29, 1969: 
The operational fund […] serves to cover the expenses, in national and foreign cur-
rencies, associated with the operational requirements of the security service and the 
Police service, and especially the expenses incurred during the organisation of an in-
flow of information enabling or rendering it easier to prevent, identify, fight criminal 
activity, provided that such expenses cannot be financed within the disclosed budget 
because they need to be kept secret.13 
The use of this fund was under strict control and any attempts of em-
bezzlement undertaken by the functionaries met with very severe pen-
alties, including immediate, disciplinary dismissal from the service. 
Quarterly statements of the operational fund include the amount of sums 
spent by certain functionaries of the sb on the maintenance of the contact 
venues and conspiratorial flats, sums spent on gifts for the secret collab-
orators and the costs of consumption spent by the functionaries during 
meetings in gastronomical venues. To a certain extent such information 
allows us currently to identify the moment of first-appearance of a giv-
en informant and to at least partially reconstruct the frequency of meet-
ings between given collaborators and their leading SB officers. however, 
it should be kept in mind that the most valued collaborators were invited 
to the conspiratorial flats and contact venues, not to cafés or restaurants. 
and this is the reason why in their cases in the books of the operational 
Fund there are no data about the number and costs of such meetings.14
The accounts between sb functionaries and their informants registered 
in the operational fund book allow to establish the amount of remunera-
tion paid to the secret collaborators. The TW pseudonyms and sometimes 
their car registration numbers were provided in the accounts. as the pseu-
donyms were sometimes repeated, the latter information is of crucial im-
13 AiPn Kr 065/23, vol. 5, p. 43.
14 Skubisz Paweł, Casus Barana – rzecz o defraudacji funduszu operacyjnego SB [The “ba-
ran” case – about Security Service operational fund misappropriation], Aparat Represji 
w Polsce Ludowej 1944-1989, no. 1(5)/2007, p. 296-315; Skubisz Paweł, Fałszerstwa do­
kumentacji operacyjnej popełnione przez funkcjonariuszy Urzędu Bezpieczeństwa i Służby Bez­
pieczeństwa [Operational file forgeries commited by Security Office and Security Service of-
ficers], Dzieje najnowsze, no. 42/4, 2010, p. 49-74.
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portance, as it also allows to unequivocally identify the collaborators who 
obtained financial remuneration during meetings with the functionaries. 
Cash reports show the amounts spent on the consumption, the gifts, and 
most of all on additional remuneration paid during meetings with secret 
collaborators, service contacts and operational contacts.
it is extremely difficult to give a summary amount of the remunera-
tion each informant was paid throughout the whole period of coopera-
tion. any established amount should be only considered as the minimal 
amount each personal source of information was given, as the preserved 
sources are not complete and some documents are missing. it is definite-
ly very important and revealing to see the exemplary sets of remuner-
ations paid to certain collaborators in different periods and to compare 
these amounts to the level of salaries and prices of these times.
The sb functionaries would quickly discover the need to provide ad-
ditional “remuneration” to the secret collaborators. All the officers lead-
ing tW “Wiśniewski” would underline his vital interest in obtaining ma-
terial benefits: 
he is cunning – rather greedy. As a person who has seen the work in counter-intel-
ligence he is aware, probably not accurately, that refusal might have a negative im-
pact onto his further plans. he is probably counting on some kind of material or other 
benefit that the cooperation might bring him”.15 the officer who closed the coopera-
tion with tW “Wiśniewski” in 1981 wrote similarly: “Despite the high social position 
[a professor of law at the uJ, renowned in international academic circles, PF] he was 
eager to accept even small amounts of remuneration.16
From the very beginning, the benefits he would be offered, were quite 
high. on the application form that was presented for formal acceptance 
of the newly-recruited TW the Director of sb Department iii in krakow 
wrote a note in hand-writing that said that there shall be sums of more than 
500 PLn, and in the middle of 1960s this meant substantial resources.
Unlike “Wiśniewski”, tW “Krakus” was rarely given any remunera-
tion for his activity. in his description prepared in January 1976 by Lieut. 
ryszard buczek for the Director of Department iii, it was stated that 
throughout the whole period of cooperation he was given 2,000 PLn and 
two cognacs. Only once later, in March 1979, was he gratified with again 
the same amount.17
15 AiPn Kr 009/9167, p. 26.
16 ibidem, p. 15.
17 AiPn Kr 00100/1285/D (mf).
77The real and expected privileges of the Security Service
Since the beginning of cooperation in 1968, tW “Las”, and subsequent-
ly TW “antoni” would be paid a relatively high remuneration. until De-
cember 1969 he was altogether given 10,000 PLn. in the following year 
his leading functionary, captain Stanisław Knapik, claimed that he should 
be remunerated with no less than 2,000 PLn on a quarterly basis, arguing 
that he was a valuable collaborator. As a result, within first 7 years of co-
operation he received over 27,000 PLn.18
Remuneration that the secret collaborators were paid in 1980s is rel-
atively well-documented. however, the amount of information provid-
ed is not exhaustive, it rather illustrates the scale of financing the persons 
cooperating with the sb and the size of the overall costs incurred on the 
maintenance of a network of oZis. it must not be forgotten that especial-
ly in the second half of the 1980s, the rate of inflation was at very high lev-
els and therefore the nominal amounts varied in their real value during 
the analysed decade. as an example, the amounts of remuneration paid 
to some of relatively well-paid sb Department iii collaborators who were 
engaged in the infiltration of the Jagiellonian University are presented be-
low (table 1). As was already mentioned, some of the secret collaborators 
would receive some payments even until 1990.
table 1. exemplary amounts of remuneration paid to secret collaborators of the SB 
Department iii in Krakow in the 1980s (in thousand PLn)
            year
TW 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
marco 34 35 35 26 25 48 31 50 35 120.5
Alex/Bart 13 32.5 17 28 13 15.5 35 17 29 10
tomek/Zbyszek 26.7 22.6 21.15 17.1 2 4 55 105.2 152.4 50
herbert 2.5 13 17 9 13 82 135 105 45
monika 5 3.3 17 10 10
Source: AiPn Kr 041/83, vol. 5, p. 13-21, 59-66, 101-107,  150-158,  216-222,  260-266, 302-305, 345-
349; vol. 7, p. 11-15, 54-59, 97-101, 147-151, 206-210, 254-259, 302-305, 352-358; vol. 9, p. 14-17, 150-151, 
222-225; vol. 12, p. 18-22; vol. 13, p. 17-22; vol. 14, p. 13-16; vol. 15, p. 20-27; AiPn Kr 041/85, vol. 1, 
p. 15-20, 74-79; vol. 2, p. 15-18, 83-90; AiPn Kr 041/93, vol. 1, p. 22-27;  vol. 4, p. 17-21, 86-91; AiPn 
Kr 041/94, vol. 1, p. 18-22, 89-93; vol. 2, p. 15-17, 91-95, AiPn Kr 041/97, vol. 2, p. 15-18, 84-87, 150-
151, 212-214.
18 AiPn Kr 009/9063, vol. 1, p. 18-36.
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other material and intangible rewards
The sb functionaries would show the proofs of their “gratitude” also in 
other forms. The collaborators would be offered gifts. usually those gifts 
would be flowers, more expensive alcohols (a bottle of cognac, whisky, 
brandy), sometimes a pack of coffee, chocolate, juice, tinned ham or stock-
ings. in the period of persisting economic hardship every gift was pre-
cious. one of the employees of the Jagiellonian university law Faculty, 
in documents presented as a service contact “aleksander”, during a meet-
ing in november 1965 was given a ream of paper for his typewriter to re-
write his Ph.D. thesis, and as is known, in those days there was a deficit of 
typewriter paper.19 such occasions as name Day, Women’s Day and im-
portant personal events would never be missed.  in May 1968 the leading 
officer gave a bunch of flowers to tW “Mag” on the occasion of passing an 
oral exam qualifying for the position of an assistant-professor. in his note, 
the functionary wrote: “TW was very touched and grateful to our service 
for having remembered about her private matters”.20 she expressed simi-
lar emotions when the sb functionaries paid her visits in the hospital and 
in sanitarium, showing care about the state of her health.
then again, Lieut. Zbigniew Cioś in the spring of 1982 paid a fine 
of 300 PLn imposed on tW using pseudonym “Adler”. in August 1983 
second lieut. Tadeusz Walkowicz granted his operational contact “rJ” 
a bottle of cognac worth 1,180 PLn as a reward for his help in “operation-
ally securing the summer school of Polish Culture and language”.21
tW “Wiśniewski”, two years before he was formally recruited, made 
an interesting offer to the sb functionaries. at the end of their meeting he 
asked the officers responsible for his recruitment to: “organise him the 
installation of a fixed telephone line in his private apartment as he has 
a social telephone which is causing him problems”.22 in those days a tele-
phone, especially in big cities, was a luxurious element of flat furnishing. 
The functionaries were well aware that by helping him out this way they 
would strongly bind this agent to the security forces.
When the researchers were concerned, the “prize” for collaboration 
would mean help in obtaining a scholarship abroad and assistance during 
19 AiPn Kr 009/6735, p. 76.
20 AiPn Kr 009/9227, vol. 1, p. 19, 51.
21 AiPn Kr 009/9888, p. 8.
22 AiPn Kr 009/9167, vol. 1, p. 35.
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such scholarship period, or in obtaining a position at a foreign universi-
ty (e.g. as a lecturer of polish as a foreign language) or a position of a rep-
resentative to some international organisation. Considering the rate of ex-
change of foreign currencies to PLn, almost every journey abroad meant 
a considerable increase in one’s income. The collaborators were given help 
in taking additional positions or in acquiring a well-paid temporary side-
job, e.g. as a language teacher at KW PZPR in Krakow. Others would ask 
for help in being allotted an apartment or ask to discontinue administra-
tive or penal proceedings held against them. as far as it was possible, and 
at the same time pursuing their own aims, the sb functionaries would 
grant such help. repeatedly it would happen that such declared help was 
fake and the proceedings continued according to regular administrative 
rules. Then again there were other oZis who would count on the sup-
port of sb in expelling from uJ persons who were a nuisance to them. The 
functionaries would pay visits to their “subordinates” during their stays 
in hospitals and sometimes they would even participate in the funerals of 
“their” collaborators.
an intervention made by an sb functionary was once very success-
ful when an agent using pseudonym “grzegorz” was called to the road 
traffic Department, because of a traffic offence he had committed. he was 
supposed to take an obligatory control exam. Thanks to the support of the 
sb the offence was cancelled.23 Probably an even more substantial help 
was given to this collaborator by the sb functionaries in the beginning of 
1981. in the following characteristics describing tW “Grzegorz” there is 
a recurring phrase: “One of the flaws discovered during the cooperation 
is the agent’s inclination to foreign currency turnover”. it was this activ-
ity that brought him to custody suite on montelupi street in krakow in 
January 1981. he was released after 12 days. the SB was also aware of the 
fact that he was storing stolen paintings.24
Regardless of the above-mentioned financial “rewards”, tW “Las” 
(“antoni”), counted mostly on other privileges and other forms of help. it 
can be best seen in the final talk, during which the secret collaborator broke 
up the cooperation. As he was avoiding contacts with the SB officers in the 
beginning of May 1982 he was called to the quarters of SB Department iii 
in krakow. Captain knapik, who recorded the talk, wrote: 
23 AiPn Kr 009/10039, vol. 3, p. 147.
24 ibidem, p. 183.
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he came in very nervous, requested explanation as to the reason of the summons, he 
would answer in a very formal, “official” way. Although we have been on first name 
terms with each other for 16 years he would call me “Sir” and demanded that the talk 
be recorded.25 When asked about further cooperation […] he replied: “For many years 
i have actively and within my possibilities helped the sb, but despite this i was perse-
cuted at the Jagiellonian university, my academic promotion was being blocked and 
so on – i reported it after you had left the SB – to your colleagues, but none of them 
did anything to help me. Currently i suffer from neurosis, i am ill and additionally 
i have different kinds of family problems, and i have not given up on my strive to be-
come assistant-professor and i still encounter problems with that. […] i cannot afford 
it any more. i cannot see my further cooperation with the sb. i need to start treating 
my health, i need to do research, i need to support my family somehow. Please, take 
this into consideration.26 
his whole speech was filled with grief towards the SB for not having 
helped him be promoted to an assistant-professor. his first work present-
ed as the basis for the promotion was dismissed in 1979. the collaborator 
therefore started preparing a new book, hoping strongly on the support of 
the ministry of internal affairs organs. unfortunately, this support was not 
granted. knapik was fully understanding of “antoni”’s explanation. he 
expressed great gratitude for his past, long-lasting cooperation. There are 
no doubts that knapik’s gratitude was sincere. he appreciated “antoni”’s 
contribution to “protecting” the university. he considered him one of the 
best collaborators he managed to recruit and in his way knapik felt sorry 
for “antoni”. This is why he wrote in the “operational notes”: 
i think that tW “Antoni” until 1973 and even later until around 1979, was one of the 
most valuable ones in this Department. The information he provided was trustwor-
thy, very accurate, prepared expertly so that it would be very useful for operational 
purposes. i think that either the period of cooperation was too long or some of the sb 
functionaries made mistakes that i do not know of in their contacts with TW, or may-
be it was the repeating failures in his academic career – these might be the motives of 
such a deep nervous breakdown of the TW which resulted in his retreat from collabo-
ration. i also think that our moral duty is – when only it is possible – to give tW sup-
port by sb functionaries in operational way so that he will be helped to overcome the 
obstacles he encountered on his way to academic promotion.27
sb supported their agents in their strives to obtain lucrative contracts 
abroad, at the same time using this support for their own operational pur-
poses. an example of such actions was the case of TW “adam”, who collab-
25 AiPn Kr 009/9063, vol. 7, p. 225.
26 ibidem, vol. 1, p. 225-225v, p. 41-42.
27 ibidem, vol. 7, p. 225v.
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orated with the SB since the break of 1970s and 1980s. he was mentioned 
in a correspondence between organisational units of the security service 
in the middle of 1986, in relation to his plans of going to Vienna universi-
ty as a polish literature lecturer. in the beginning of may the Director of sb 
Department iii-1 in Krakow informed: 
During his stay in vienna TW “adam” stayed mostly in the institute of slavic 
Languages of the local university. he was assured by the Director’s office that they 
would apply to the local ministry of science and research to repeat the call for a polish 
literature lecturer considering the application of TW. The initiative seems quite realis-
tic if only it is met with a similar strive undertaken by our ministry of science, higher 
education and Technique to appoint such a position in terms of Polish-austrian agree-
ment on academic and cultural cooperation. TW “adam” asked whether he could, in 
such a situation, count on our support, referring to his stay in Vienna in 1979-1982 
when he rendered services to Dep. i of the ministry of internal affairs.28 
on the other hand side the head of sb inspectorate i informed Department 
i of the ministry of internal affairs: 
tW “Adam”, asked by major J.[ohn] Krawczyk, who was handling him, declared be-
ing ready to execute operational tasks during his stay abroad and to remain in con-
tact with our officer in Austria or FRG, just like it happened during his previous stay 
in austria. back then he maintained contact with comrade l. Pintera. he remained in 
contact also for some time after he had returned to the country. back then he was us-
ing the pseudonym “Midro”. Basing on the opinion of both major J. Krawczyk and 
com. l. Pintera i suggest to operationally use TW “adam”’s stay for intelligence pur-
poses of your Department, and therefore i suggest to consider a proper preparation 
for him before he leaves and to overtake him as a contact abroad. however, in this 
case it would be very important to exercise some operational actions by Department i 
of the ministry of internal affairs in the ministry of higher schooling and Technique 
to make sure that the possibility of appointing TW “adam” was not cancelled by 
someone else being promoted to this position as a results of the so-called “fraternal 
connections”.29
also other collaborator, using pseudonyms “Philosopher” and “ol-
gierd” would use help in organising his travels abroad. Registered in 1967 
he was a valuable collaborator, which can be proven by the fact that in 
march 1971: “he received a passport with the right to cross the border 
multiple times, within and outside of europe, until revocation”.30 in the 
light of the passport policy of the day it was an exceptional situation and 
28 AiPn Kr 065/24, vol. 6, p. 180.
29 ibidem, p. 176.
30 AiPn Kr 309/399, p. 2v.
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a proof of a very deep trust on the side of the ministry. as a collabora-
tor of the SB Department iii – 1 he was handled by, among others, the 
Director of the Department, which also showed the high rank assigned to 
him in the hierarchy of the collaborators. sb showed him gratitude also in 
other forms – both in cash (e.g. in the amount of 7,100 PLn in September 
1988 and 6,690 PLn in December 1989) as in flowers worth e.g. 820 PLn in 
november 1988 and as much as 3,720 PLn in December of that year and 
1,970 PLn in June 1989.
TW “mag” had an exceptional motivation to undertake collaboration 
with the SB, counting on specific profits and privileges. Deputy Director of 
SB Department ii in Krakow, major Jerzy Barcik thought that the motiva-
tion derived from “a need to take the anger out”.31 but the analysis of the 
materials produced by TW “mag” clearly shows that the main driving force 
of her actions was a feeling of strong antipathy against prof. Przemysław 
mroczkowski, director of the english literature institute. “mag” expect-
ed that with the help of the sb it would be possible to “put the relations in 
the institute in order”. lack of appropriate actions on the sb side resulted, 
in the beginning of 1980s, in a serious frustration of the agent and lead to 
closing the cooperation of one of the most dedicated secret collaborators. 
this situation was described by Lieut. A.[ndrzej] Buluk: 
tW resented us also. he did not state it directly, but one could figure it out. tW used 
to inform us about the persons allegedly morally unfit and professionally unprepared 
to act as academic lecturers. it did not bring the results he had wished for. on the con-
trary he had noticed that those persons, thanks to acquaintances and the support of the 
director – antagonist of the tW, were being promoted and remunerated. it caused tW 
to have doubts about he sense of maintaining further contacts and influenced the de-
cision to put an end to the cooperation.32 
it was with difficulty that the functionary convinced the agent to meet for 
the last time, which eventually took place on May 2, 1980 in Park Jordana. 
During this meeting he pointed again to mroczkowski as the person who 
had been persecuting him in the institute, blocking his voyages abroad 
and ordering him to perform duties which did not require the qualifica-
tions of a professor. in the opinion of the collaborator, there were many 
faults and inaccuracies in the institute. he expressed grief as despite long-
lasting and devoted collaboration he did not get any help from the side 
of the sb. Turning to the lieutenant he was supposed to have said: “no 
31 AiPn Kr 009/9227, vol. 1, p. 17.
32 ibidem, p. 52.
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one needs me anymore and you don’t need me anymore. What can i tell 
you?”.33 in this case the functionaries did not fulfil the expectations of a se-
cret collaborator.
Closing remarks
Despite strong connections with the Prl’s special forces the sb collabo-
rators not always could count on the help of their supervisors and it would 
also happen sometimes that they would become victims of the service’s 
actions. in one of the more interesting events described by ko “rJ” there 
was some information about an intervention in the students dormitory 
“Piast” in Krakow, in July 1984 performed by unknown persons claiming 
to be sb functionaries. Participants of the Jagiellonian university summer 
and Polish school that “rJ” was taking care of, were lodged there. again, 
in August 1985 the SB functionaries intervened in the Central train Station 
in krakow, when the participants of the summer school of Polish Culture 
and language, during their trip to gdansk, photographed railway infra-
structure objects. in the report, KO “RJ” underlined that the form of the 
intervention was an unpleasant surprise to everyone. in a memo, an sb 
functionary wrote: 
Participants of the course, citizens of USA, were clearly satisfied that they finally met 
with the security service that they had heard of from hostile editors. They asked us 
questions, like whether the tour leaders would come back to the summer school, if 
they would be beaten, how long they were going to be kept in the custody suite and so 
on. the situation was additionally inflamed by the fact that the whole group was be-
ing kept in a bus at the station. in the opinion of the employees of the school this form 
of intervention brings bigger losses – mostly with respect to propaganda – than poten-
tial gains. in their opinion cases of similar incidents can and should be handled much 
more discretely, so that the participants of the course do not have the image of Poland 
as a police state.34
“rJ” also had an extremely bad luck when he was coming back to 
Poland by train in December 1984. Back then the functionaries of the 
Customs Office in Zgorzelec confiscated him five books printed in 1983 
33 ibidem, vol. 3, p. 350.
34 AiPn Kr 009/9888, p. 24-24v.
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and 1984 in West Germany. the officer from the Border inspection Post 
who recorded a note wrote: 
While depositing the above mentioned books the citizen […] was very outraged and 
crossed, he said that if they keep his books it would be a political scandal. he works at 
the Jagiellonian university.35
many a time the functionaries would assure their “subordinates” of 
the help they were allegedly exercising, whereas in the reality all the mat-
ters were settled in an official way. this was the case with tW “Grzegorz”, 
recruited in the beginning of 1980 for “offences committed in hungary”, 
for which, according to his leading officer, inspector Zbigniew Cioś, he 
might have been persecuted. in 1980 “Grzegorz” wanted to go on holidays 
to bulgaria. During his stay in hungary the record in his identity card, en-
titling him to travel within the communist countries, was cancelled by the 
local authorities. the collaborator turned for help to inspector Cioś. he in 
turn found out that the Passport Department did not impose any restric-
tions on “grzegorz”  regarding People’s republics and that he could easily 
obtain a new record if only he had applied for it. but “grzegorz” did not 
know about it. Cioś faked help writing: 
Considering the engagement that TW “grzegorz” has shown in the past i suggest that 
we should enable him to go to bulgaria for his even better work in the following year 
and during the pilgrimage to Częstochowa.36 
it was similar when “grzegorz” decided to take up studies again in 
September 1981. he was allowed to start studies again according to the 
official rules, without an SB intervention. But also in this case Cioś wrote: 
“TW is convinced that we helped him in being admitted to studies”.37
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